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Struggle for Acceptance – Maintaining External 
School Evaluation as an Institution in Germany 
Anne Piezunka ∗ 
Abstract: »Kampf um Anerkennung - Die Stabilisierung externer Schulinspektio-
nen als Institution in Deutschland«. In the educational field, evaluations  
based on standardised indicators play a major role in the determination of evi-
dence-based regulations. To have an effect within a policy field, evaluations 
based on standardised indicators have to become institutionalised. Neverthe-
less, very little is known about the strategies that actors apply to institutional-
ise their procedure and whether these strategies are successful. This paper ex-
plores the strategies that German school inspectorates use to maintain external 
evaluations based on standardised indicators as an institution. The paper draws 
on educational governance research and institutional work. By conducting ex-
pert interviews with staff members of school inspectorates, I show which strat-
egies are used to increase the acceptance by school representatives. Two strat-
egies can be identified: school inspectors try to make less judgements and 
focus on descriptions of what they have observed (strategy I), and school in-
spectors give school representatives a greater say when formulating expecta-
tions for schools (strategy II). From a governance perspective, these strategies 
mean that school representatives are perceived as equal partners. They also im-
ply that school representatives do not have to give up any of their autonomy, 
which is also a necessary condition for the institutionalisation of school inspec-
tions. 
Keywords: Educational assessment, school inspection, institutional work, indi-
cators, educational governance. 
1.  Introduction 
University rankings, test scores, and teacher evaluations – there are several 
ways to assess quality within the educational field. These types of evaluation 
have become highly institutionalised in recent decades: for example, Espeland 
and Sauer studied how universities react to rankings. According to their study, 
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some universities changed their admission policies to improve their position 
within the rankings (Espeland and Sauder 2007). Another possible indicator for 
the institutionalisation of a mode of evaluation is whether its existence is taken 
for granted (Scott 2008). This also applies to university rankings: “We are so 
accustomed to rankings that they have become a naturalised way of making 
sense of the world” (Espeland and Sauder 2016, 5; see also Kehm 2014, 102; 
Salais 2008). Nevertheless, many criticisms have arisen in recent years: re-
searchers and practitioners have criticised several methodological aspects. 
Rauhvargers (2014) questions the selection of indicators that are used to com-
pare universities. For example,  
University rankings continue to focus on the research function of the universi-
ty and are still not able to do justice to research carried out in the arts, humani-
ties and the social sciences. (Rauhvargers 2014, 40)  
Nevertheless, while external evaluations such as university rankings in the US 
or the school inspection model in England (OFSTED) can be understood as 
highly institutionalised, certain types of evaluation within the educational field 
are only partly institutionalised. 
In the case of the federal states of Germany, a new type of external evalua-
tion was introduced in 2004/05 in every federal state. The states’ ministries of 
education established external evaluations based on standardised indicators to 
estimate the quality of public high schools. When evaluating the quality of 
schools, school inspectors analyse documents, conduct personal interviews, and 
carry out classroom observations. Thereby, inspectors apply a set of indicators: 
frequently used indicators in classroom observation sheets are “The class starts 
on time” or “The children are treated with appreciation”.  
After the first cycle of school inspections, which took around five years, 
many criticisms arose. Several researchers questioned whether school inspec-
tions had any impact on school improvement measures (Gärtner, Wurster, and 
Pant 2013; Gärtner 2011). Furthermore, several teacher associations and unions 
argued that school inspections meant a large workload for schools but were not 
very effective (BLLV 2017; GEW Berlin 2008). In response to these criticisms 
and for financial reasons, some federal states abolished their school inspections 
(Hessen in 2016, Rhineland-Palatinate in 2015) or put them on hold (Saxony 
since 2015, Thuringia since 2015, Baden-Wuerttemberg since 2017, Bavaria 
since 2018, Schleswig-Holstein between 2009 - 2016). Within the remaining 
school inspectorates, some staff members articulated the need to undertake 
changes to ensure their continued existence (in the case of Lower Saxony, see 
Sowada and Dedering 2016, 183). 
Against this backdrop, this paper explores the strategies used by staff mem-
bers of school inspectorates to maintain external evaluation based on standard-
ised indicators as an institution and discusses whether they were successful. 
Due to the fact that many decisions in the educational field are justified with 
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reference to external evaluations (Heinrich 2010), it is important to analyse 
which circumstances define the development of indicators:  
Decisions about how to make elements of experience commensurable are par-
ticularly influential during the development of metrics, and this can generate 
path dependence for subsequent interpretation of data and its effect on action. 
(Sellar 2014, 133) 
To identify the strategies used by staff members of school inspectorates to 
maintain external evaluation as an institution, this paper draws on research on 
institutional work. In this regard, Lawrence and Suddaby describe the practices 
of individual and collective actors aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupt-
ing institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Furthermore, to analyse the role 
of school inspectorates within the German education system, the paper builds 
on the literature on school inspectorates (Heinrich 2015; Dietrich and Lam-
brecht 2012; Sowada and Dedering 2016) and relies on the educational govern-
ance approach (Altrichter, Brüsemeister, and Wissinger 2007) as a research 
perspective. The educational governance approach identifies dependencies and 
analyses expectations and interests formulated by different actors. In methodo-
logical terms, I conducted interviews with staff members of school inspec-
torates in several federal states and applied a qualitative content analysis 
(Gläser and Laudel 2009). I argue that staff members of school inspectorates in 
some federal states applied similar strategies to increase their acceptance by 
school representatives and thus seek to maintain external evaluation as an insti-
tution. In general, this study situates itself in a research field that understands 
indicators as socially constructed and not as a neutral instrument to gather data 
(Diaz-Bone 2017; Lamont 2012; Kehm 2014, 103). 
2.  Case Study: School Inspections in Germany  
All federal states introduced school inspectorates around the same time (Füssel 
2008, 153). However, there are many differences between state-specific inspec-
torates. Each inspectorate developed its own indicators and procedures. For 
example, there are differences from state to state regarding who receives the 
report and whether former teachers are the only ones permitted to conduct 
school inspections. There are also many similarities between the school inspec-
torates. Most of them use standardised indicators (except Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern and Bremen1) to assess school quality. They apply similar meth-
ods to gather data, such as personal interviews, classroom observation, and 
online questionnaires. Further, most of them have similar expectations regard-
                                                             
1  As they don’t apply standardised indicators, the federal states Bremen and Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern are not part of the sample.  
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ing how schools should deal with the inspection report: after the inspection, 
schools are tasked with negotiating target agreements with school authorities. 
Furthermore, in some federal states, if a school performs poorly, the inspection 
interval is shortened, and the next inspection takes place after two years instead 
of after four to five years.  
Whereas in other countries there exists publicly accessible information on 
school quality, there are only three federal states in Germany that publish a 
shortened version of the inspection report online (Berlin, Hamburg, and Bran-
denburg), and no federal state publishes rankings. The fact that school rankings 
are not made public might be explained by the existence of strong teacher 
associations that are opposed to it (Piezunka 2018). 
Furthermore, in the case of Germany, there is no federal state in which 
schools face sanctions such as school closure or financial cuts, as would be the 
case for failing schools in England and the Netherlands. Therefore, compared 
with other countries, the German inspection model is often described as a “low 
stakes system” (Altrichter and Kemethofer 2015). Furthermore, when assessing 
the quality of schools, German school inspectorates focus on data at the process 
level: they want to learn more about day-to-day practices. In other states, data 
at the output level, particularly the results of test scores, play a major role, 
which is not the case in Germany (Piezunka 2018). 
The introduction of school inspections can be understood as a political 
measure implemented after the so-called “PISA-shock” in Germany (Böttcher 
and Keune 2011; Altrichter and Kemethofer 2016). The states’ ministries of 
education wanted to know what was going on in schools after they had ob-
tained bad results in the PISA study. The PISA study is an international pro-
gramme of the OECD which evaluates national education systems by measur-
ing 15-year-old students' performance on mathematics, science and reading.  
Hence, they introduced school inspectorates as a supplement to school authori-
ties, which were and still are responsible for monitoring schools in Germany 
(Maritzen 2008; see also Heinrich 2015). The introduction of school inspec-
tions was a response to the so-called “crisis of school authorities” (Maritzen 
2008): the rise of evidence-based governance in the educational field had iden-
tified a need for the introduction of school inspections in order to collect data 
systematically, as the school authorities didn’t do this. Before this, school mon-
itoring primarily consisted of peer feedback, examination of future teachers, 
and personal exchange with school authorities.  
Furthermore, the understanding of school governance has changed (Heinrich 
2007; Dedering and Sowada 2016). In the nineties, schools were given more 
autonomy regarding finances, pedagogy, and curricula (Heinrich 2007). The 
result was that educational ministries had to establish measures to monitor how 
schools dealt with their new degree of autonomy. This was another reason for 
the introduction of school inspections. Avenarius describes this development as 
a “contradictio in adiecto” (Avenarius 2006, 6-7), as the monitoring of schools 
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by school inspectorates would also imply that school representatives again lose 
some degree of autonomy.  
The monitoring of schools is just one of several functions that school in-
spectorates should theoretically fulfil. According to Landwehr (2011, 39f; see 
also Maritzen 2008; Heinrich et al. 2014) further functions are ascribed to 
school inspectorates within the education system: second, school inspectorates 
are required to generate knowledge about schools that can be used for a variety 
of purposes (Landwehr 2011). To do so, they use standardised indicators to 
gain insights into the current state of the school (function of knowledge produc-
tion). Therefore, school inspectorates generate empirical data that should theo-
retically provide an objective knowledge base for policymakers (Dietrich and 
Lambrecht 2012). Third, based on the knowledge they have gained, school 
inspectors are tasked with initiating school improvement measures (Landwehr 
2011): the results of school inspections give schools an idea of the issues that 
should be addressed in the future (initiating function). Fourth, school inspec-
tions are intended to contribute to implementing standards of school quality 
within the federal state. The indicators thus represent normative understandings 
of what a good school is (function of implementing standards) (Landwehr 
2011). Fifth, by defining school quality and interpreting policy guidelines, 
school inspectorates set expectations. Therefore, they act as policymaker (Pie-
zunka 2018). 
In this context, it should be considered that some of these functions might 
have contradictory implications for schools. If school inspectors want to initiate 
school improvement measures, they need to know what challenges schools are 
currently facing. For this to occur, it is necessary for schools to speak openly 
about their problems. However, given the monitoring function, schools want to 
create a good impression (“window dressing”). They therefore tend to hide the 
challenges and problems they are facing. Furthermore, the monitoring function 
and the initiating function represent different ideas of school governance. The 
monitoring function implies a hierarchical relationship between school inspec-
torates and schools, whereas the initiating function aims at “school develop-
ment through reason” (Dietrich and Lambrecht 2012). “Inspectors and actors at 
school shall meet each other ‘at eye level’” (Dietrich and Lambrecht 2012, 57). 
While the monitoring function means that schools must meet school inspec-
torates’ expectations, the initiating function allows for the perspectives and 
interests of school representatives to be heard and considered during the in-
spection. The initiating function might even imply that school representatives 
have a different understanding of the schools’ performance and therefore do 
not initiate any changes after the inspection has taken place (Dietrich and Lam-
brecht 2012). 
Regarding the functions described above, school inspectors’ descriptions of 
their role within the education system and the schools’ perception of school 
inspectorates vary (Heinrich et al. 2014). For example, it is possible that one 
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function is perceived to be more important than another or that one function 
isn’t relevant at all. In addition, there are not only variations between actors, 
but also differences at the state level regarding the weighting of the functions. 
Therefore, in actual practice, there may be differences in the relative im-
portance of these functions and, as a result, some attributes of the inspection 
process might vary depending on the relevance of the functions.  
3.  Theoretical Framework 
To understand how staff members of school inspectorates act and which strate-
gies they apply to maintain school inspection as an institution, this paper relies 
on the educational governance approach as a research perspective. Further-
more, defining school inspections as an institution with a low degree of institu-
tionalisation, the study draws on research about institutional work.  
3.1  Educational Governance Approach 
The educational governance approach can be understood as a research perspec-
tive that is interested in questions of regulation and is based on certain theoreti-
cal assumptions. Changes in the educational field are “not shaped by a single 
dominant actor” (Altrichter 2010, 148). Therefore, actors’ interests and de-
pendencies between actors must be considered to understand certain practices 
(Kussau and Brüsemeister 2007). Furthermore, formal hierarchies might not 
explain dependencies between actors.  
Within the education system, school inspectorates and school authorities are 
part of the public educational administration and can be described as an inter-
mediary actor between the educational policy level and the school level 
(Brüsemeister 2007, 93; Sowada and Dedering 2016, 175). School inspec-
torates have an ambivalent relationship with high-level educational policymak-
ers: on the one hand, policymakers introduced the school inspectorates to moni-
tor schools. On the other hand, policymakers will be held accountable by the 
public if too many schools are rated poorly by the inspectorates. Therefore, 
policymakers want schools within their federal state to perform well on average 
when they are being evaluated by school inspectorates (Piezunka 2018). Fur-
thermore, school inspectorates depend on high-level educational policymakers 
because they decide whether school inspectorates continue to exist. 
The relationship between school inspectorates and schools depends on the 
functions that school inspectorates are supposed to fulfil. The initiating func-
tion implies that school inspectors recognise school representatives as profes-
sionals and perceive them as an equal partner during the inspection process. By 
contrast, the monitoring function implies a strict hierarchical relationship as 
well as the requirement for schools to meet the expectations of inspectorates. 
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Therefore, when school inspectorates try to fulfil both functions, schools re-
ceive ambiguous signals regarding their position of power. 
Another important actor for school inspectorates are school authorities. 
School authorities are tasked with negotiating target agreements with the 
schools after the inspection has taken place, but in practice they often perceive 
the inspectorates’ data as unhelpful (Heinrich 2015). Furthermore, and as men-
tioned above, there are certain overlaps between school inspectorates and 
school authorities regarding their areas of competence within the educational 
system. Both are supposed to monitor what is going on at schools but they use 
different monitoring procedures and they have a different scope of action to-
wards schools. Nevertheless, these overlaps require school inspectorates to 
legitimise their procedure within the education system (Heinrich 2015). To sum 
up, school inspectorates face diverging interests. In addition, school inspec-
torates also send ambivalent signals regarding their own function.  
3.2  Institutional Work  
This paper understands external evaluations based on standardised indicators as 
an institution. Scott describes them as follows:  
Institutions are comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive ele-
ments that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability 
and meaning to social life. (Scott 2008, 48)  
The regulative pillar of institutions is reflected in certain rules and it is based 
on a coercive mechanism (Scott 2008, 51). The normative pillar represents 
“rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into 
social life” (Scott 2008, 54). The cultural-cognitive pillar describes the “shared 
conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through 
which meaning is made” (Scott 2008, 57). Whether all three elements (regula-
tive, normative, cultural-cognitive) are at work varies from one institutional 
form to another (Scott 2008, 62). 
Regarding school inspection, these pillars can be used to describe the degree 
of institutionalisation. The description of the degree of institutionalisation 
varies depending on its function. Therefore, it makes sense to distinguish be-
tween the monitoring function and the initiating function of school inspec-
torates. In theory, the monitoring function implies the following: school inspec-
tions are obligatory for all schools (regulative pillar). Schools should fulfil the 
expectations formulated by school inspectorates (normative pillar). Further-
more, school representatives are aware that monitoring through external eval-
uators is necessary (cultural-cognitive pillar).  
By contrast, the initiating function has the following implications regarding 
the institutionalisation of school inspections: after the inspection has taken 
place, school representatives make target agreements with school authorities 
about future measures (regulative pillar). School representatives should use the 
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feedback provided by school inspectorates when implementing school devel-
opment measures (normative pillar). School representatives are aware that they 
need external feedback from school inspectorates to develop further (cultural-
cognitive pillar).  
To sum up, school inspection in Germany would be highly institutionalised 
if these descriptors applied in practice. For some aspects, this might be the 
case. For example, school inspection is obligatory for schools in every federal 
state (except Schleswig-Holstein). Hence, schools cannot choose whether they 
want to be evaluated by school inspectorates. Furthermore, it is probable that 
schools try to meet the expectations formulated by school inspectorates to 
avoid having to justify poor results. This might be the case especially in those 
states where a shortened report is published online and is therefore accessible 
for potential future students and their parents. Regarding the normative pillar, 
an empirical study in lower Saxony shows that school inspection increases the 
awareness of principals and teachers of the strengths and weaknesses of their 
schools (Sommer 2011, 144; see also Senatsverwaltung für Bildung and Jugend 
und Wissenschaft Berlin 2014). Nevertheless, there are also many studies that 
prove that school inspection has a low impact on school development measures 
(for an overview, see Altrichter and Kemethofer 2016). Furthermore, the cul-
tural-cognitive pillar does not play a major role in Germany. Whereas OF-
STED, the school inspection model in England, is taken for granted, many 
actors in Germany question whether there is a need for data from school in-
spections to assess the quality of schools (BLLV 2017; GEW Berlin 2008). In 
addition, school inspectorates in some federal states were abolished and others 
are afraid that something similar is going to happen to them. 
To sum up, school inspections are institutionalised to a certain degree as 
most of them have been in operation since 2004/05, they are obligatory for 
schools, and school representatives try to meet the requirements formulated by 
the indicators. Nevertheless, school inspections are only partly institutionalised 
because many school representatives oppose the procedure and still do not take 
school inspections for granted. Therefore, there is a need for action to maintain 
school inspection as an institution.  
While a lot of research treats institutions as given (Scott 2008, 93), there is a 
lack of research analysing the measures that are used to maintain institutions 
(Scott 2008, 122; Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, 23). It is important to research 
the maintenance of institutions as there are only a few institutions that do not 
require intervention to ensure their maintenance (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, 
229). Lawrence and Suddaby argue that strategies used to maintain institutions 
should  
be distinguished from simple stability or the absence of change; institutional 
work that maintains institutions involves considerable effort, and often occurs 
as a consequence of change in the organization or its environment. (Lawrence 
and Suddaby 2006, 234)  
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Based on a review of the empirical literature, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) 
describe six forms of institutional work that are applied to maintain institutions 
(Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, 230): the first activity, “enabling”, refers to 
strategies which “facilitate, supplement and support institutions” (Lawrence 
and Suddaby 2006, 230). This might imply the introduction of a new actor who 
is tasked with ensuring the adherence to the norms of an institution. Further-
more, enabling work might also imply that existing conflicts between institu-
tions are overcome (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, 231). The next activity, 
“policing”, suggests that strategies with a high degree of coercion are applied 
to ensure that actors comply with the rules of an institution (Lawrence and 
Suddaby 2006, 231). For example, there would be sanctions in the case of non-
compliance. Furthermore, auditing and monitoring can also be understood as a 
form of “policing” (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, 231). A third activity Law-
rence and Suddaby (2006, 232) have identified is “deterring.” It refers to strat-
egies which prevent the development of new institutions or institutional 
change. In the context of school evaluations, obligating practitioners and re-
searchers to use the data collected by school inspectorates to evaluate schools 
constitutes an example of deterring behaviour.  
Furthermore, the fourth activity, “valourizing and demonizing”, tries to link 
existing norms to the institution (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, 232). School 
inspectorates could use narratives to show that their work is necessary to ensur-
ing that children are able to learn and to feel safe. Another form of institutional 
work is “mythologizing” (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, 233). In practice, this 
might imply the development and communication of founding myths which 
represent the norms of the institution. The sixth form of institutional work is 
“embedding and routinizing.” It refers to strategies which make sure that the 
institution becomes part of the practitioners’ daily practices (Lawrence and 
Suddaby 2006, 233). In the case of school inspection, one strategy of routiniz-
ing has been observable since the beginning, as the school inspection usually 
takes place every four to six years.  
If German school inspectorates take into account the situation of school in-
spectorates in other countries, it is probable that they apply strategies which are 
already in use in those countries. This would be the case if school inspection 
introduced rankings or sanctions for failing schools which can be linked to 
“policing”. Regarding the existing dependencies within the educational system, 
school inspectorates might apply strategies which can be linked to another 
activity: “enabling work.” This form of institutional work might lead to over-
coming existing areas of tension with schools because, as described above, 
school inspections threaten their autonomy.  
Furthermore, the following has to be taken into account: Although actors 
apply different strategies to create and maintain institutions, they are not al-
ways successful in this endeavour (Scott 2008, 96).  
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4.  Methods  
In order to capture strategies, I conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with 
the staff members of school inspectorates in nine federal states carrying out 
external evaluations based on standardised indicators2. Most of them worked as 
teachers or school principals before they started to work for the school inspec-
torate. Some of them continued working as teachers part time while they con-
ducted external evaluations. Furthermore, some federal states employed so-
called “scientific instructors” who were responsible for data analysis and fur-
ther empirical questions. Some of the persons interviewed mainly conducted 
external evaluations at schools on a regular basis, while others were responsible 
for scientific issues. All of them were involved in the development of indica-
tors. 
The interviews lasted between thirty and ninety minutes. All interviews 
were audiotaped and transcribed. I used MAXQDA software and a qualitative 
content analysis approach as described by Gläser and Laudel (2009) to analyse 
the interviews. Following the educational governance approach, the analysis 
was based on the following categories: “relevant agents and their interests 
regarding school inspections,” “changes regarding the indicators,” and “func-
tions of school inspections.” In this process, I noticed certain patterns regarding 
the acceptance of school inspections by school representatives and the strate-
gies applied by staff members to increase this acceptance. During the analysis, 
Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) heuristic model allowed me to identify actions 
which are related to maintaining external evaluations based on standardised 
indicators as an institution.  
5.  Results  
In the following, I describe the strategies that staff members use to maintain 
school inspections as an institution. These strategies aim at increasing the ac-
ceptance of these inspections by school representatives. As Scott argues, social 
acceptance from certain actors has important implications for the degree of 
institutionalisation (Scott 2008, 59). School inspections often lack acceptance 
from many school representatives because of the negative positions of some 
lobby associations described above. In this regard, staff members of school 
inspectorates assume that the lack of acceptance may be one reason why school 
inspections have a limited impact on school development measures (initiating 
function):  
                                                             
2  This paper is based on interview material that is part of the author's PhD-project on the 
development of indicators regarding inclusive education (Piezunka 2018). 
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If you want to initiate measures at schools, you need a procedure that is ac-
cepted by schools. School representatives should have the impression that they 
can accept what school inspectors observe and report. (18_19; also; 8_36; 
15_12; 18_15; 5_38; 11_17)  
Therefore, staff members assume that a higher acceptance of inspections by 
school representatives would allow school inspectorates to fulfil their initiating 
function to a higher degree (see also Sowada and Dedering 2016, 192). Fur-
thermore, school representatives’ increased acceptance might have a positive 
impact on policymakers’ opinions of school inspection, and this might be the 
case irrespective of whether or not school inspectorates fulfil the initiating 
function.  
Some interview partners even link the school inspectorates’ right to exist to 
its acceptance by school representatives: one interviewee argued that the in-
spectorate she works for is not at risk because “we treat schools very carefully 
and we are very open and appreciative from the beginning” (2_9). In addition, 
one interviewee said that the school inspectorate he was working for faced 
closure because it was strongly rejected by lobby associations (18_17). In sum, 
staff members argue that the acceptance of school inspections by school repre-
sentatives is necessary if they want to fulfil their initiating function towards 
schools. In turn, they assume that fulfilling the initiating function to a higher 
degree could stabilise school inspection as an institution. In the following, I 
will describe strategies used by staff members of school inspectorates to in-
crease their acceptance by school representatives and to maintain school in-
spection as an institution: 1) by having more descriptive and less evaluative 
components in the inspection report and 2) by involving school representatives 
when formulating expectations.  
5.1  More Description, less Evaluation  
Even if their database allows rankings, no German school inspection publishes 
any rankings. In addition, after the first cycle, some school inspectorates began 
dividing their inspection report into a descriptive and an evaluative part (for 
Lower Saxony, see Sowada and Dedering 2016). Some features of schools are 
described but not evaluated. For example, they write that “40% of the observed 
classes started on time.” They do not link the description to any benchmarks or 
make evaluative statements.  
In the classical sense of ‘good’, there is no school that scores well or badly.  
[...] We don’t want to evaluate. This is why we don’t say ‘regarding our 
standards of school quality, you are a good school or you are a bad school.’ 
(9_49)  
Interviewees include descriptive parts in their inspection reports in order to 
leave the task of evaluation to school representatives: “I don’t know if it is 
good or bad. Only the school knows – the school knows if this is what they 
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want” (4_18; also 17_34). Others claim that school representatives can take 
into account the circumstances of the specific school:  
We don’t evaluate whether the school is good. Maybe they have tried really 
hard for five years or for three years to reach a certain level. Maybe they had 
3% and now they have 15%. (5_17) 
To sum up, in some states, school inspectors only describe and evaluate certain 
features of schools in their reports. They want to leave the task of evaluation to 
school representatives. Nevertheless, they report that many schools perceive 
the descriptive part as evaluative: “It’s their self-perception: ‘We are bad. [...] 
We have been evaluated as bad.’ School inspectors say: ‘No, we didn’t evalu-
ate anything. We just observed and described. You are evaluating’” (11_16). 
The reason might be that school representatives don’t have the initiating func-
tion of school inspectorates in mind but instead perceive them as a controlling 
body (monitoring function).  
Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that “each choice of indicators 
and weighting reflect value judgements” (Kehm 2014, 103). For example, the 
indicator “the class starts on time” represents a commonly held norm, namely 
that it is preferable for all classes to start on time. Hence, even if they try just to 
describe what they see, it already implies a certain degree of evaluation.  
Irrespective of whether the school inspectorates’ strategy might not be un-
derstood as intended, it can be seen as an attempt to increase the acceptance of 
inspections among school representatives and therefore to have a higher impact 
on school development measures (initiating function). 
5.2  Formulating Expectations for Schools  
Various actors are involved in the development of indicators: educational re-
searchers, school authorities, and further representatives from the ministries of 
education. To increase acceptance of inspections by school representatives, 
school inspectors also want to consider the views of school representatives 
when they formulate expectations towards schools. “It’s like that… we try, no 
... we know that we have to and we want to cooperate with others if we want to 
have an impact” (16_15). The issue of inclusive education illustrates the in-
volvement of school representatives regarding the development of indicators: 
in 2009, Germany signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. As a result, Germany has to implement an inclusive education 
system. However, there is no shared understanding of how to define inclusive 
education in Germany (Moser 2012; Piezunka, Schaffus, and Grosche 2017). 
School inspectors considered the views of school representatives when they 
developed indicators regarding inclusive education: “Schools should imple-
ment inclusive education, but we must not expect too much of schools. We 
have to take into account what schools are able to do in light of their circum-
stances” (8_16; also 7_28; 12_31). Furthermore, many staff members consid-
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ered their experience as school inspectors. When evaluating the schools within 
their federal state, they got an idea of what school representatives think is fea-
sible regarding inclusive education in their specific circumstances. When for-
mulating expectations about inclusive education, school inspectors weighed up 
their own ideas of how inclusive education should be implemented in schools 
against what they knew about the concrete implementation process in their 
federal state (Piezunka 2018). 
In some cases, staff members admitted that their expectations regarding the 
implementation of inclusive education were very low:  
We require very, very low standards – this might change over the years when 
there are more schools that implement inclusive education. Then, we could in-
crease the standards. (17_47)  
They formulated expectations that are achievable for the majority of schools in 
order not to overburden schools.  
Nevertheless, school inspectors are aware that the implementation of inclu-
sive education is prescribed by law and that this legal requirement exists inde-
pendently of the school-specific circumstances and opinions of school repre-
sentatives. Hence, they are acting in a context riddled with conflict: on the one 
hand, they want to control the implementation of inclusive education as a legal 
entitlement. As a result of this, some inspectors argue that certain minimal 
standards should be fulfilled to make sure that students with disabilities receive 
the support they need. On the other hand, many inspectors do not want to ex-
pect too much of schools because they assume this would decrease the ac-
ceptance of school inspections in general. To sum up, the feasibility of expecta-
tions plays a major role in the formulation of expectations of schools by school 
inspectorates.  
6.  Discussion  
Staff members of school inspectorates used different strategies to increase their 
acceptance by school representatives. They changed the presentation of their 
data (more descriptive, less evaluative) and gave school representatives a 
greater say when formulating expectations. Therefore, these strategies have an 
impact on which indicators are applied to gather data and how the results of the 
data collection are presented to the public. By increasing acceptance, staff 
members of school inspectorates hope to have a higher impact on school devel-
opment measures (initiating function). Furthermore, school representatives’ 
acceptance is not only important regarding the initiating function but also be-
cause high-level educational policymakers consider what school representa-
tives think when they decide whether school inspections should continue to 
exist.  
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Comparing the strategies of school inspectorates with the six practices of in-
stitutional work described by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, 230), we can see 
evidence of “enabling” as one form of institutional work. Increasing school 
representatives’ acceptance can be understood as a strategy which is applied to 
overcome existing areas of tension with school representatives (“enabling 
work”). By contrast, the practice of “policing” has decreased in relevance be-
tween the first and second cycle of school inspection. There are two reasons 
which might explain the situation in Germany: first, it seems as if the school 
representatives’ associations have a greater say in Germany than in other coun-
tries. This is because associations representing the interests of school repre-
sentatives are very powerful in Germany. Hence, when making decisions re-
garding school inspectorates, policymakers consider their interests (Piezunka 
2018). Second, to ensure school representatives’ autonomy is a very dominant 
norm in Germany. Therefore, it is not surprising that school inspectorates apply 
strategies which can be linked to “enabling work” as they are not able to use 
strategies with a higher degree of coercion.  
Given the mutual dependencies and the functions that school inspection 
should theoretically fulfil within the educational system, the situation is para-
doxical: on the one hand, school inspectorates need the acceptance of school 
representatives and policymakers to ensure their existence. On the other hand, 
to be able to fulfil the initiating function and, in particular, the monitoring 
function, it is also necessary that school representatives give up a certain de-
gree of autonomy. However, the strategies described above mean that school 
representatives are treated as equal partners, which implies that they don’t have 
to give up a certain degree of their autonomy. Therefore, striving for more 
acceptance from school representatives might imply that school inspectorates’ 
efforts to reach a higher degree of institutionalisation might not be successful 
because school representatives don’t have to give up a certain degree of their 
autonomy, which is also necessary in regard to school inspectorates’ monitor-
ing and initiating function. Considering the initiating function, schools have to 
give up a certain degree of autonomy because they have to accept that external 
evaluators are a necessary prerequisite for learning more about their school’s 
strengths and weaknesses and to conduct school improvement measures. Com-
pared to the initiating function, the monitoring function implies even more 
strongly that schools lose a certain degree of autonomy because they are asked 
to comply with the standards formulated in school inspectorates’ indicators and 
their own understanding of school quality is ignored.  
These observations raise the question of whether these strategies to maintain 
inspection as an institution have been successful. Acceptance of school inspec-
tion by school representatives is seen as a necessary condition for initiating 
school improvement measures (initiating function). However, it is not clear 
whether these strategies do in fact lead to higher acceptance or whether higher 
HSR 44 (2019) 2  │  284 
acceptance leads to a stronger impact regarding school development measures. 
Regarding the latter, one person interviewed admits,  
To be honest: the most successful function is the monitoring function. This 
might not be our desired function. I would prefer if we were able to initiate 
school development measures. (15)  
Therefore, a higher acceptance of school inspection by school representatives 
does not necessarily imply that the initiating function is fulfilled to a higher 
degree. However, the question of whether these strategies are successful cannot 
be resolved due to a lack of data.  
Considering the inspection model in England and in the Netherlands, it is 
possible that an increased focus on the monitoring function and the application 
of strategies that ensure compliance through enforcement (“policing”) or that 
establish coercive barriers to institutional change (“deterring”) would be more 
successful at institutionalising school inspections than the strategies described 
above. Potential strategies might include the introduction of higher sanctions 
for failing schools or the publication of school rankings. These strategies imply 
that the initiating function would lose its relevance. Furthermore, focussing on 
the monitoring function would mean that it is not necessary for school inspec-
tors to be accepted by schools. Irrespective of the desirability of the implica-
tions of these strategies, their implementation is not possible in Germany be-
cause the scope of action of school inspectorates in the education system is 
different from other inspectorates such as OFSTED, which describes itself as 
“independent and impartial” towards the ministry of education (Rutter 2013). 
Therefore, other forms of institutional work, such as “valourizing and demoniz-
ing” (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, 230), which are within the school inspec-
torates’ scope of action, could be more successful in maintaining school inspec-
tion as an institution. However, it is unknown whether these strategies have 
ever been applied by German school inspectorates.  
To sum up, given the existing dependencies, school inspectorates aim at in-
creasing their own acceptance and focus on the initiating function to ensure 
their continued existence. Nevertheless, these strategies might not be successful 
at institutionalising school inspections because these strategies also imply that 
school representative don’t have to give up any autonomy. The latter is a nec-
essary condition for school inspectorates to be able to fulfil certain functions 
within the education system. 
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